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Does INEVITABILITY follow from DETERMINISM? Someone claims: “If you accept determinism, you must accept “ultimate inevitability” of all that happens. Response: Yes, if you frame the concept of ‘determinism’ in a particular way. But why should we allow that such is the correct version of ‘determinism’? Determinism ---as the metaphysical view that the universe, at least the physical universe, is causally deterministic--- can be traced to different historical roots, some related to religious doctrine, but the more interesting type related to what can loosely be called “scientific” thought. This is generally the view that the world is deterministic in the sense that all events can be analyzed or investigated as resulting from prior events or conditions. This is the position of much classical, empirical science which generally seeks to explain an event ‘E’ in terms of the causes and conditions that lead to ‘E’*. This is the picture of reality that a rational, ‘scientifically-minded’ deterministic philosopher like Spinoza assumes as true. Given conditions Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd, ....E occurs. An objective of empirical science is to gain some knowledge and understanding of some aspect of the world. According to one version of empirical science, the scientific investigator assumes a general picture of reality in which there are causal conditions for the phenomenon or event that is being investigated, designated as ‘E’. Accordingly, the investigator gains understanding of E when he finds that Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd, . . . are the underlying causes/conditions for E to occur. This implies that we learn which prior conditions are causally sufficient for the occurrence of E. But we should also be able to identify the set of conditions without which E would not occur. In other words, the aim of our “scientific” inquiry is to identify both the necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of ‘E’. Accordingly, the scientific statement would be one that tells us that given Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd, . . E occurs. But this does not imply that E was inevitable, unless it can be shown that the conditions leading to E were inevitable, and the same for the conditions leading to the first set of conditions. Science does not make such claims. In many (if not most) cases scientists and rational investigators are interested in the range of conditions that result in E, and the conditions whose absence would lead to not-E. For example, de-forestation and consequential loss of plant and animal food sources led to the collapse of civilization on a Easter Island. Had the environmental conditions and cultural practices been such as to preserve the forests, the Easter Island culture would not have collapsed as it did. This would constitute scientific explanation of the event; it does not require that the investigator prove that the event (e.g., collapse of Easter Island society) was inevitable. [As additional evidence against the claim that causal explanation implies inevitability consider that evolutionary biologists explain the evolution of specific forms of animal life (e.g. mammalian life) by citing the conditions that resulted in the animal form in question (viz. give causal explanation); but definitely deny that such evolution was inevitable (see Gould or Dawkins on the question of “re-running the tape” of evolution.)] The claim that everything that happens, [E, Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd, ...] is inevitable is a metaphysical claim, which is not required by a scientific picture of reality and the accompanying concept of ‘determinism.’ Many philosophers have made the straight move from ‘C causes E’ to the conclusion that ‘E’ was inevitable. But the proposition that ‘E is caused by events Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd, ...’ is a distinct claim from the metaphysical claim that E was inevitable [and distinct also from the claim that Ca, Cb, Cc, Cd, ...were inevitable.] Both claims call for analysis. [See + below for a preliminary attempt at analysis.] It is not clear how the ‘inevitability’ claim could be defended. It is not an empirical claim. At best it follows from a specific concept of ‘determinism,’ but this is an optional concept, and there is not much reason for holding that it is definitive or correct. *This ‘deterministic’ picture of reality in which scientific explanation proceeds in terms of causal connections applies only to some sciences. It is not the governing methodology in such sciences as theoretical physics, particle physics and other such physical sciences. In some scientific areas, mathematical analysis and application of theoretical models play a greater role than the assumption of causal connections and a ‘deterministic’ universe. A minimal, working definition of causal relation of A causes B:
+ The simple causal chain: A causes B. ‘A’ is the sufficient condition for ‘B’. If ‘A’ happens, ‘B’ is inevitable. This is the “billiards” picture of causality. Ball ‘A’ strikes ball ‘B’ causing ‘B’ to roll in the direction determined by the direction, momentum, and spin of ‘A’. Given ‘A’s’ motion and direction, ‘B’ motion and direction are inevitable. Given ‘A’, ‘B’ follows inevitably. But this only restates the simple causal relation between A and B. It does not affirm that ‘B’ simpliciter was inevitable. This would follow only if ‘A’ itself were inevitable. Now for more complicated cases of causality [See ‘% Dennett’ below.]: ‘E’ happens because of a set of antecedent events that obtain: Ca, Cb, Cc, ...For example: Let ‘E’ = Sam stole the loaf of bread. Let the antecedent events be such as Sam was hungry, had hungry children to feed; Sam was penniless; the loaf of bread was easy to grab; Sam had both the ability and opportunity to grab it and escape, and such. Call this set of events “S1”. [The term “event” is used in broad sense; it can include conditions or situations.] Suppose that the set [S1] was sufficient for ‘E’; but that each event alone was not sufficient for ‘E’ to happen. Suppose that some events were necessary, some not necessary. This means that a different set of events [S2] that lacks just one necessary element, but otherwise closely resemble the first set, would not have caused ‘E’ to happen. Suppose also that a different set [S3] lacked a different necessary element, thus would not have resulted in ‘E.’ Now ask, “Was E inevitable?” The answer is not a simple one. We cannot simply say that ‘E’ was inevitable because S1 was inevitable. For S2 could easily have occurred, dropping just one element necessary for ‘E’; and ‘E’ would not happen. We cannot say that S1 was inevitable, unless we show that S2 was impossible. How would we do that? Saying that ‘E’ was inevitable would require demonstrating that any number of likely sets: S2, S3, Sn...n were impossible. Obviously, this is a distinct task from demonstrating that, as a matter of fact, S1 caused E. Furthermore, as Daniel Dennett points out in the following excerpt, people behave very differently from billiard balls, and what may be applicable to the billiard ball case is not likely applicable to human behavior. % Dennett: The following excerpt is from D. Dennett’s book, Elbow Room, pp. 32-33 “When we think of causation, we tend to think of nicely isolated laboratory cases of causation, where a single, repeatable, salient effect is achieved under controlled circumstances. Or we think of particularly clear cases of everyday causation: Hume’s billiard balls, sparks causing explosions, one big salient thing bumping into another big salient thing. We know that on closer examination we would find every corner of our world teeming with complicated, indecipherable, tangled webs of causation, but we tend to ignore that fact. Thus when we think of someone caused to believe this or that, we tend to imagine them being shoved willy-nilly into that state. The person thus caused to believe is analogized to the billiard ball caused to roll north, or the liquid caused to boil in the test tube. “But in relying on these analogies we tend to ignore a major difference: test tubes and billiard balls are deaf and blind. You don’t have to whisper in front of the test tube, or make sure the billiard ball doesn’t see you watching it. People and higher animals, on the other hand, are designed to be highly sensitive to virtually everything that happens around them. It is, in fact, utterly impossible to get an awake, normal human being into exactly the same “cognitive state” (let alone the same microphysical state) on two different occasions, simply because time passes and unless one is comatose or in some other sort of Rip Van Winkle state, one notices and hence is constantly changing. “But when one starts thinking about the implications of determinism ---the thesis that everyone’s beliefs are caused, for instance--- one almost invariably shifts to a vision that ignores (or deliberately dismisses) the information-gathering apparatus that is our most impressive causal interface with our surroundings.” ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Does Dennett Deny Determinism? Contrary to what others have stated, Daniel Dennett does not reject determinism. In his book, Freedom Evolves, Dennett points out that the deterministic scheme is one of causal sufficiency. Accordingly, determinism can be expressed in these terms: The state of the world at T1, [call this “S1”] suffices to bring about the state of the world at T2 [call this “S2”]. Then the determinist points out that, given S1, S2 is inevitable. The event designated by S2 could be a physical happening (e.g. tree hit by lightning) or it could be some behavior by some organism (e.g., bird flies left instead of right, a person steps out the door). The determinist claims that, given an exhaustive list of conditions S1 holding at T1, the state of reality at a later time T2, designated as S2, follows inevitably. This is what some people refer to as the “ultimate inevitability” of all things that happen (physical events, behavior of organisms, human actions). The relevant concept here is that of causal sufficiency, which is found in the proposition that the state of the world S1 is causally sufficient for the state of the world S2 at a later time. Dennett grants this deterministic scheme based on causal sufficiency, but argues that causal sufficiency by itself will not justify a claim of causality. He directs attention to causal necessity and notes that when we claim that one event (C) causes another event (E), we normally conceive of E as a necessary condition for E, not just a sufficient condition. (For example, lightning may be sufficient to set the tree on fire, but if one demonstrates that there was no lightning at the time, we deny the conclusion that lightning caused the fire.) In particular cases of cause and effect, it is not enough to show that C is sufficient for E happening. We must also show that without C, E would not happen. We must show that C was both sufficient and necessary for E. (This is the point of his coin-flipping example in his book Freedom Evolves. see page 85. We generally see a coin flip as having random result because we cannot pinpoint the necessary conditions for the coin falling HEADS (or TAILS). Thus, for all practical purposes we take the result of the coin flip to be random or without specific (detectable) cause.) Thus, Dennett undermines the common inclination to think of causal connections only in terms of causal sufficiency. An exclusive focus on sufficiency suggests ‘inevitability,’ in that once C happens, E is inevitable. But when we bring in the notion of necessity of C we introduce the idea of alternative possibilities, which points away from the notion of ‘inevitability.’ This, in turn, undermines the philosopher’s assumption that determinism entails inevitability. In building his argument that ‘determinism’ must be separated from the idea of inevitability, Dennett argues that the ‘determinism’ of causal sufficiency [e.g., given S1, S2 is inevitable] is consistent with S2 being a genuine case of ‘evitability,’ in the sense that S2 could refer to an organism’s behavior in successfully avoiding something such as an obstacle or predator (S2 could also refer to a human agent’s behavior in selecting between various alternative actions). In other words, Dennett argues that the causal sufficiency between T1 and T2 does not establish that behavior at T2 will be inevitable in the sense relevant to the possibility of genuine avoidance, genuine choice between alternatives, and the sort of action that we ordinarily call free action. [There are various ways of arguing this point. Dennett offers his style of arguments in his works Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves; but there are other approaches, one of which emphasizes the conceptual aspect of the determinism.] ----------------------------------------------------------- Focus on causal sufficiency and inevitability seems to follow from causation. Given that A is sufficient cause of B; then suppose A, B follows inevitably. None can deny this. When we bring in necessity as part of our concept of causation, we get a different picture. Asking whether A is a necessary condition for B, we’re inclined to consider alternative possibilities: Could ‘B’ have happened without ‘A’? Whether our answer is affirmative or negative, we consider alternative possibilities (“possible worlds”) in which other causal conditions could have resulted in B. Yes, the victim died from a heart attack, but he could have died from a drug that simulates a heart attack. Looking at alternative possibilities undermines the notion that any one possibility (the actual chain of events) is inevitable. So, even assuming sufficient causation, we have no grounds for claiming that the causal chain ‘A => B’ is inevitable. For in many cases we have to consider alternative possible causalities: for example, ‘C => B’. And we surely don’t have any reason for thinking that the alternative causal relation ‘C => B’ is inevitable. Different causal chains leading to B are possible. There is no inevitability of any one causal chain. . Moreover, other possible worlds include causal chains of events that result in NOT-B. Here we see additional reason for denying that any single causal chain leading to B is inevitable. *********************** Another response [alternative to the one given by Dennett] to the claim of deterministic causal sufficiency is to critique that very claim. Determinists and others seem to assume that this scheme of causal sufficiency describes the structure of reality. Even when limited to physical reality, this metaphysical claim is questionable. How could the determinists and fellow travelers ever demonstrate their metaphysical proposition? Some of them have argued that a scientific approach requires that we presuppose the scheme of causal sufficiency. Dennett, apparently is willing to grant them this much. An alternative is to raise critical doubts about this assumption. Consider that the causal scheme is a way of thinking and talking about the world, a way of conceptualizing things. It is a conceptual scheme that underlies some scientific methods, but not all. There is much work in the sciences, even in the physical sciences, which does not rest on the scheme of causality. Like most conceptual schemes, the causal scheme is one which can be criticized and evaluated, even if it is basic to much of our “scientific-rational” thinking about the world. The correct application of this conceptual scheme is a limited one; we apply it in specific cases to limited aspects of reality in order to explain that limited region of reality. The correct application of the causal scheme does not require that we posit an ideal scheme of causal sufficiency applicable universally, and it does not require that one embrace some form of indeterminism. The causal scheme, whether thought of as causal sufficiency, or causal sufficiency and necessity, has its proper use in our “scientific” and rational thought. But it is not an assumption, explicit or implicit, of all work in the sciences*; and it does not justify universal application of causal determinism, as the determinists et al would have it. *A number of philosophers of science, have expressed doubt that the simple cause-effect scheme, as a basic conception of physical reality, is an assumption evident in the work of the sciences. [See Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza, pp. 151-2, 155-6 for mention of this issue.. See also N.W. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery. ]------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ideally or ‘in principle,’ everything or nearly everything (events, actions) can be analyzed in terms of causal connections. Hence, everything can be seen as inevitable [what Ricci calls “ultimate inevitability”] in relation to putative, prior causally sufficient state of the universe. --- Of course, this is just a way of conceptualizing things, a way of thinking and talking about things. There is nothing here to show that all scientific work presupposes this conceptual scheme, that scientific work requires it, or that this conceptual scheme describes the ‘structure of reality.’ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ The free-will issue concerns our way of talking and thinking regarding a class of human actions [behavior]. The issue is one of an applicable conceptual scheme, of discerning which of our concepts and linguistic terms are applicable. Likewise, the use of “deterministic” concepts concerns our strategy for explaining phenomena, rather than being expressive of a metaphysics, one which would raise more questions than it would answer. It is not a question of what philosophy, as a metaphysical enterprise, can discover about the nature of reality. It is not the case that philosophy, operating as some type of “super-science” can discover that the ultimate nature of reality is deterministic, in the sense that everything that happens, happens inevitably. Suppose that the claim of hard determinism was taken as a significant proposition [metaphysical? scientific?] expressing a truth claim. Would we classify it as an empirical proposition? If so, what evidence supports it? Would we classify it as analytically true, or true by definition? If so, then it is just a matter of definition and what the definition entails. It would still remain a question of whether the definition is a good one. The hard determinist could use an analogy with theoretical physics. At the macro-level we apply concepts of human-sized objects, e.g. chairs, tables, cups, dogs. But at the micro- and atomic- and subatomic- levels other concepts apply and are scientifically correct: e.g. atoms, electrons, genes, neutrons, protons, quarks and such. In scientifically correct terms, our physical reality consists of atoms and void (a lot of space!), although we ordinarily speak about our physical reality in terms of ordinary-sized objects. Likewise, the determinist might claim that for ordinary usage, speaking of free-will and avoidability is practical and allowable, but emphasize that the correct description is that all actions are strictly determined by prior events and conditions, that there is no “free actions” and that everything is ultimately inevitable. The problem with such analogy is that the hard determinist has nothing much to support his revised picture of human actions [behavior], whereas theoretical physicists can offer arguments and evidence to support their revised picture of physical reality. Whatever our metaphysician-determinist offers is debatable, and ultimately doubtful. ----------------------------------------------------------- The cause-effect scheme, applicable to much of real happenings in the world, is itself a conceptual scheme that humans apply in order to get an understanding of reality. This conceptual scheme itself is subject to rational critique and evaluation. When it is applied to certain areas of reality, the cause-effect scheme works much like an empirical proposition. We can observe causal connections that hardly anyone would question, e.g. physical happenings like billiard ball examples, relations between temperature and pressure, sunlight and organic growth, and such. Of course, even in the physical realm, evidence of these causal connections will vary. In some cases, few would question the claim that a specific happening has an identifiable cause, e.g., the billiards ball case. In other cases, we operate on the assumption that the event in question has a specific cause(s), although we might not be able to identify the cause, for example, the result of a coin flip. In other areas, such as those of human actions and social phenomena, although few deny general application of the cause-effect scheme, specification of cause-effect becomes even more questionable. The cause-effect scheme functions more like a presupposition of our attempts to explain things rather than following directly from observation. Hence, we might have cases in which we do not know, and have no way of learning, the actual cause(s) of the event or action, but assume that there must be such a cause. [See N.W. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, Chapter 3 - Causality.] ----------------------------------------------------------------- The claim that “all events are causally determined” refers to our explanatory scheme. In order to explain and understand event ‘B’, we look for causal condition “A” which explains ‘B’. [For example, the cause of his illness was yesterday’s insect bite.] Given an adequate knowledge of event “A” (insect bite) one could infer ‘B’ (subsequent illness). Does this imply a claim as to the nature of reality, vis-a-vis ‘B’? It could, in part, but we should not get carried away. In some cases, such as that of the insect bite and consequential illness, this connection can be established by the applicable science. But in other cases, the connection is not so clear. For example, when “D” is ‘the decision to invade Iraq’ and “C” is ‘the set of events and conditions preceding the decision’ the causal connection is controversial. Here it is obvious that we are dealing with a conceptual issue. Given certain conceptual presuppositions and a common intellectual culture (assumptions, language), we claim (along with all those who participate in our intellectual culture) that C caused D. Have we thereby shown that ‘C caused D’? Have we shown that this “causal connection” follows from our knowledge the structure of reality? At the very least, this is a debatable proposition concerning “D” (decision to invade Iraq) and “C” (set of conditions and events preceding the decision). How could anyone ever show that the structure of reality implies that, given “C”, it was inevitable that GW Bush would decide to invade Iraq? The proposition becomes even more doubtful, even verging on nonsense, when the claim is that everything that happens, all historical, psychological, cultural events, all individual actions and such, are inevitable. All this seems part and parcel of a metaphysical philosophy that advances certain, unexamined propositions purporting to describe the structure of reality. (?) =============================================== Other than theoretical presuppositions and philosophical assumptions, there are no compelling reasons for asserting that the simple, mechanistic cause-effect scheme describes the structure of all physical reality, much less all biological, psychological, social and cultural reality. Work in the following areas would not have accomplished much if the controlling principle had been the assumption of simple, mechanistic cause-effect in all of nature: Quantum physics, Relativity physics, Biological sciences – Natural Selection – Genetics, etc Much work in theoretical physics is based on mathematical models, rather than a cause-effect scheme. Reliance on a strictly deterministic picture of the universe would leave us unable to explain all the genuine and apparent randomness in nature, both at the quantum level and at the macro level. Finally in the areas of the social sciences and humanities, the assumption of a simple cause-effect scheme is of limited usefulness, and the notion “ultimate inevitability” is not helpful at all. Can anyone seriously propose that we could explain such phenomena as history, culture, the arts, literary genius, religious phenomena, etc. as simply inevitable chains of causally-conditioned events? ----------------- The assumption (presupposition) that everything can be explained in physical terms DOES NOT entail the proposition that reality is structured according to a mechanistic, cause-effect scheme, and also does not require assumption of a universal causal scheme. These are distinct propositions, without any obvious logical connections. Any claim to their being logically connected would have to be defended. ----------------- Suppose I come to a fork in the road. Do I take the south path or the north path? I have no reason for preferring one to the other; so I flip a coin: HEADS I go north; TAILS I go south. The coin comes up TAILS and I take the south path. Now what does the inevitability metaphysics tell us? That it was inevitable that I take the south path, because it was inevitable that the coin would come up TAILS. (??) That it was inevitable that I would take the south path (that the coin would come up TAILS) is either a true or a false claim. If we say it is true, it is true only in the sense that what happens happens, a truism hardly worth stating. If we say it is a significant claim (what happens happens inevitably), then it is false. The coin flip had a 50/50 chance of coming up HEADS. So the coin coming up TAILS (and my taking the south path) was not inevitable in any meaningful sense of the word “inevitable.” ---------------- If inevitability is a metaphysical assumption, then there is no argument. You simply assume inevitability and then try to conceptualize the rest of reality in these terms. (But here one is merely playing a metaphysical game.) If inevitability is a hypothesis about reality, then we must investigate (inquire?) to learn whether it is true that real events are inevitable. When we do we find much reason (evidence?) for denying that real events (things that happen, things we do) are inevitable. We find much reason for denying the hypothesis of inevitability. |
