THE NEO-CONS: HOW WE GOT INTO THE DITCH
( from the July 2006 issue of HALVASON NEWS )

First impressions can't foretell success in marriage, still it's unusual when negative first impressions lead to such a compatible union as happened between the neo-cons and George Bush, II. When Bush threw his hat into the year 2000 primaries the neo-cons who had been despondently marking time during the Clinton years grumbled Bush would be another weak-kneed moderate like his father who'd been too much a wimp to move into Iraq during the Gulf War. 

Their impression was strengthened when in his campaign speeches Bush promised that if elected he would conduct a "humble" foreign policy. "Just as we refuse the crown of empire," he said with passion, "Let us not dominate others with our power." He promised he'd be very reluctant to send American troops to fight overseas. Repeatedly he spoke disdainfully of nation-building and of trying to impose democracy on other nations. Once when debating Al Gore he flung at his contender contemptuously, "He believes in nation-building!" It was disconcerting to the neo-cons to hear Bush disparage precisely what they had in mind to do if they ever got a chance. 

Bush was remarkably unversed in foreign affairs, and had visited Europe briefly once. His campaign message was certainly guided and embellished by his campaign adviser Condoleezza Rice, who had been suggested to Bush by his father's friend General Scowcroft. Rice was a political science professor at Stanford which was committed to a pragmatic political science favoring containment and detente and disfavoring meddling in the foreign affairs of other countries. Nation-building and force-feeding democracy were no-nos and Rice expounded that view in foreign policy journals. 

There were several dozen neo-cons including converts in Washington, variously in government, far right think tanks and conservative media. Most had been students of Professor Leo Strauss at the University of Chicago during the mid-century and remained disciples of his strange political philosophy. In Washington they had clung together in loose cooperation, promoting their aggressive but thus far unsuccessful agenda. In 1998 a neo-con action group called The Project sent an open letter to President Clinton advocating a preemptive military attack on Iraq and "other potential aggressor states." 

The neo-cons early sized up John McCain as the best of the Republican contenders and he got their votes in the primaries. But come Election Day and a choice between Bush and Gore they voted for Bush with hopes his running mate, Dick Cheney would straighten him out. Cheney and the neo-cons had worked in close political association since the Seventies, when they opposed the containment policy of Nixon, preferring a more confrontational foreign policy. Bush's first response to the neo-cons seems to have been wariness, knowing their preference for McCain. Down in Austin, Texas in the columned governor's mansion, the sophisticated neo-cons had been out of his realm. His surprise election had been an almost numbing experience, and his team-up with the neo-cons was more or less accidental. 

Due to the hectic vote-recount, the transition was prolonged and chaotic. Cheney assumed a dominant role in staffing, and when indecision set in over filling the important Defense Secretary slot he sent for Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld had been out of government for more than two decades, engrossed in corporate responsibilities. Paul Wolfowitz, long the dedicated leader of the neo-cons, who had served as Secretary of Defense Cheney's deputy during the Gulf War, now became Rumsfeld's deputy. Wolfowitz's protege, "Scooter" Libby, was named Chief of Staff, and Rice became National Security Adviser. Colin Powell's great popularity with the public dictated a cabinet post, and logically his spot would have been defense secretary, but Powell had clashed with the neo-cons during the Gulf War and got himself branded a dove. He was named Secretary of State, and neo-con John Bolton was made Powell's deputy to keep watch on him. Twelve more neo-cons were assigned meaningful positions in the Administration. 

The agenda of the first cabinet meeting was full to overflowing, but Wolfowitz, who never missed a chance to urge that the U. S. invade Iraq, did so even on that crowded occasion. He had already expressed his preference for such action at his confirmation hearing. As usual, no one responded, and Bush made no comment. That was of no consequence, however, as that was to be his standard behavior for weeks to come. At staff meetings he said nothing, didn't even ask questions. Staffers reportedly were divided over whether his demeanor expressed hauteur or concealed ignorance. On one occasion Bush made a rare comment, prompted by some reference to Palestine. Bush said he thought the U. S. should stay out of the trouble between Israel and Palestine. The only person who questioned the wisdom of that was Colin Powell. But that Bush seemed unaware of the blocked peace process must have alarmed the neo-cons who were staunchly committed to the security and welfare of Israel. 

To observers it was apparent early that the real power in the administration radiated out of Cheney's office. Nothing ever got decided until doors closed behind them. It was also noticed that quite a lot was being decided. Cheney's deputy "Scooter" Libby assembled a skilled and seasoned team of neo-cons; he also helped Cheney recruit a broad range of experts. Cheney was getting equipped to play a major role in shaping Bush's agenda. 

Things started happening. By June, the administration had reached decisions to reject six important international treaties. These included the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and three lesser treaties. Wolfowitz, Perle and John Bolton played large roles in these rejections, which drew strong denunciation from the international community. 

Bush had gone along with scuttling the international treaties. But now something else was being urged on him that gave solemn pause. He was being importuned to invade a sovereign country and remove its president. Not just Wolfowitz was arguing invasion of Iraq, but Cheney and Rumsfeld just as insistently. And before him on his oval office desk laid reams of "eyes only" intelligence that attested to massive and growing daily stockpiles of armament and deadly biological weapons. All of that would be trained on the U. S. if allowed to continue. And only he could stop it! 

Bush's brain must have played back to him all those campaign speeches he made - the futility of nation-building, the illogic of forcing democracy, the dangers of interfering in foreign politics, and his opposition to sending troops overseas. At that time he may have regretted that a certain distance existed between him and his father. Of course it had mended since that publicized fistfight on the lawn at Kennebunkport, but after entering public office he had maintained his independence. He confided to a journalist that he now consulted a "higher father." 

It's not known just what led him to reverse his campaign promises. True, his persuaders did have some fertile ground to work in. Bush knew his father had been criticized for not invading Iraq during the Gulf War, and as a born-again Christian it may have been appealing to visualize himself leading a crusade against unbelievers. He may have heard war presidents are popular presidents. More surprising, perhaps, is that Rice would flip-flop, reversing a career-long espousal of Stanford's "real politick" pragmatism in her teaching and writing. But during her earlier stint as a Pentagon writer she gained a reputation for agreeing with whoever conferred with her. She seemed dazzled by brass and title, and it was noted early in the Administration that she strove to stay in Bush's good graces by taking the position she believed he favored. According to Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell's Chief of Staff, "She would guess which way the President would go and make sure that's where she came out. She would be an advocate up to a point, but her advocacy would cease as soon as she sniffed the President's position." The probable, but shameful, explanation of her swift encapsulation by the neo-cons is that she simply trotted in with Bush. 

On September 11, nine months into his administration, Bush was interrupted when reading "My Pet Goat" to second-graders in Crawford, Texas, with news of the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. It was the size catastrophe the neo-cons said it would take to convince the American public to accept their leadership. 

On September 15, Bush's cabinet gathered at Camp David for a strategy session to plan response to the acknowledged attacker, Afghanistan's Taliban government. It wasn't the first time they had discussed response, and all present were aware of Wolfowitz's obsession with Iraq. Still, most were surprised by his behavior. As the joint chiefs of staff were weighing how best to retaliate against Afghanistan, Wolfowitz interrupted and said they shouldn't invade Afghanistan. They should invade Iraq. The group fell into stunned silence as he launched into rapid argument that attacking Afghanistan "would be uncertain." It has unusually rough terrain. He fretted about a hundred thousand American troops getting bogged down in mountain fighting. War against Iraq would be easier, more doable. When his arguing raced on with no sign of stopping, Bush got word over to Chief of Staff Andrew Card to shut Wolfowitz up. 

Powell then spoke up to disagree. "Retaliation logically should be made on the attacker, Bin Laden and the Taliban," he said, "not some other target. If you get something pinning September 11 on Iraq, great, let's put it out and kick the mat at the right time. But let's get Afghanistan now!" Cheney and Rumsfeld didn't back up Wolfowitz at that session, but later they told Bush they too favored invading Iraq instead of Afghanistan. Of course Afghanistan finally was agreed on for targeting, but it was understood by many at that gathering that Iraq would be next. 

On September 20 the semi-official Defense Policy Board (neo-cons all) sent Bush a letter urging him to attack Iraq "even if evidence does not link directly to the attack." Signers included neo-con journalists Charles Krauthammer, William Kristol and Norman Podhoretz. Standing on the back of that truck at Ground Zero with a bullhorn made Bush a new man. Out were diffidence and uncertainty; in were forceful voice and macho stride. Soon after, he was bolstered by something more. Aware the whole world was watching for some powerful response, it must have seemed an answer to his daily White House prayer meeting to learn the neo-cons had a plan that filled the bill. 

The plan was made under Wolfowitz's direction in 1992 when he was working under Cheney in the Bush Sr. Administration. It was a comprehensive military blueprint for planning, building and deploying a force capable of overcoming any force on the planet. Beyond deterring military attack on the U. S., the force must be prepared to "preclude threats" and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It would act independently and preemptively when necessary. Wolfowitz's sizable team included "Scooter" Libby and Zalmay Zhalizad. With Clinton's election the plan went into a Pentagon file cabinet. Early in 2000 the neo-cons expanded it into the 76-page military plan. Now in 2001 it's time had come. 

On October 7, less than a month after the attacks on New York and Washington, the Afghanistan War got underway with an air and ground offensive. It succeeded from the start. The Taliban lost towns and cities in swift succession. Within weeks the last stronghold had fallen, and in less than a month the war was over. Resistance had been surprisingly weak. Among the Coalition of the Willing were France, the U.K., Canada, Germany and Russia. Iran, then our friend, opened its borders to the refugees, and assisted our coordination with the Northern Alliance. 

But was it victory? Only partially. Bin Laden had escaped the net in Kandahar, reportedly because the Pentagon had reduced its forces there, already anticipating the Iraq War. Furthermore, the Commander-in-Chief had made no plans to assist a civilian restart, which might have prevented the deterioration that soon set in. According to Bob Woodward, on November 21, 2001, Bush asked Rumsfeld to start work on plans to invade Iraq. He said, "Get Tommy Franks looking at what it would take to protect America by removing Saddam Hussein, if we have to." He told Rumsfeld to keep it secret. 

In his State of the Union address in January 2002 Bush said the states of Iraq, Iran and North Korea constituted an Axis-of-Evil because they were seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction. The charge puzzled the American public and irritated the international community. Powell objected to such inflammatory rhetoric. He said the U. S. should be trying to calm the Middle East by addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Cheney and Wolfowitz objected to Powell's criticism. 

The Axis-of-Evil taunt pleased the neo-cons. It showed Bush really meant to hit Iraq! The atmosphere became almost a merry "we're off to topple a tyrant." Still, the War Party realized they'd have to sell it to the American people, and they'd all have to be salesmen. Bush being a magnet for mikes and cameras would take center stage and he entered into it with panache. Wherever he spoke his theme was the ever-present danger. The danger to our country is grave; the danger to our country is growing. Iraq has increased its capacity to turn out lethal weapons. It has reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. It's very near a nuclear bomb, probably less than a year. It has quantities of anthrax and sarin. The U. S. will not permit the world's most dangerous regime to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. Our security requires all Americans to be ready for preemptive action. In all his speeches he got it in that if you question the war you are unpatriotic. 

Meanwhile, the neo-cons were out building the case. Richard Perle, who like Wolfowitz had been promoting an Iraq war since the Seventies, warned that if the U. S. failed to invade Iraq, "It will open the floodgates of terror against us." 

There were glowing promises. Rumsfeld assured the Senate that reconstruction would be financed by the Iraqi government, not by the American taxpayer. Wolfowitz said, "We're dealing with a country that can finance its own reconstruction. There's lots of money there." He also said, "The vision that the first Arab democracy could open up would be stunning." William Kristol said that after the U. S. invades Iraq, all the other Arab states "will jump on the bandwagon." Ahmed Chalabi said that Saddam's militia would collapse "at the first whiff of gunpowder" and the invasion "will be a cakewalk." 

Another drumbeat for war (and anything Bush) was being sounded by the evangelicals, especially via televangelist radio and fundamental pulpits. The neo-cons and the evangelicals had found each other back in the Seventies when both turned on Carter and helped block a second term. Their hopes had risen when Carter declared himself "born again." The neo-con's founder Leo Strauss had counseled them to encourage religion, whether they practiced it or not, because it helped keep society in line. 

But Carter's foreign policy didn't suit them. Then the evangelicals turned on Carter with a vengeance after he held a White House conference on "Families" which included alternative lifestyles. Ever since the neo-cons and evangelicals had found it politically expedient to support each other. A survey made in late 2002 showed that 67% of conservative Christians favored going to war with Iraq - 10% higher than the population in general. 

The growing war talk caused alarm. General Scowcroft wrote in the New York Times deploring war plans. He said that instead of planning unilateral military action the U. S. should be working with its allies to get U. N. weapons inspectors back in Iraq. An Iraq war would have dire consequences in the region, he said. Two other Bush Sr. cabinet members spoke to the press discouraging war and urged that weapons inspectors be returned to Iraq. It was rumored Bush Sr. had requested those men to go public and was himself appealing similarly to his son. Son Bush's response to the unwanted advice was some sword rattling in a speech before the U. N. General Assembly. 

The sword rattling unnerved Powell. He too wanted the weapons inspectors returned. Cheney and Rumsfeld were against it, and Bush thought them ineffective anyway. He had been showing some signs of doubt, which probably prompted his decision on September 1 to ask Congress to support military action against Iraq. Some staff members insisted there was no need to ask Congress or the U. N. for approval, considering the grave threat looming from weapons of mass destruction. But Bush felt he needed support from Congress. 

The request met strong opposition, especially from Democrats, especially from Feinstein, Daschle and Kennedy. "But where's the evidence?" they demanded. There's no conclusive evidence, no new evidence, no eminent threat! Bush's team held small meetings, large meetings, meetings in cloakrooms, meetings in the White House Situation Room. "You can't let this linger!" All were warned. "Doing nothing is not an option!" The CIA's tenet gave an ominous report on Saddam obtaining aluminum for constructing centrifuges and seeking yellowcake uranium from Niger (both reports later proved false). The day before the vote, Al Gore sharply criticized the Administration's advocacy of preemptive war, calling it a doctrine that would replace "a world in which states consider themselves subject to law" with the notion that "there is no law but the discretion of the President of the United States." 

On October 11 Bush got resolutions from both houses authorizing him to use the U. S. Armed Forces in Iraq "as he deems to be necessary and appropriate." The vote was 29 to 133 in the House, 77 to 23 in the Senate. Feinstein and Daschle voted yes, Kennedy voted no. Bush had carte blanche. 

Although discouraged by the Defense Department, Bush decided to also seek a support resolution from the U. N. on disarmament. Blair, who was feeling heat from war protestors, said he needed it too. At the end of the Gulf War the U. N. had required Saddam to disarm and submit to regular inspections. The inspectors had found nothing of importance when in 1998 they withdrew, complaining they lacked free access. Inspections had never been resumed and rumor had it Saddam was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction and concealing it. Bush in mid-'02 publicly accused Saddam of being in noncompliance of disarming and threatened military action if he didn't comply. Saddam responded by inviting inspectors to come back, and the U. N. subsequently sent in a new team that resumed inspections on November 27. 

The State Department duly requested the U. N. resolution Bush and Blair wanted. On November 8 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 that declared that Iraq was still in breach of its obligations under previous resolutions and was required to provide an accurate, full and complete declaration of all its weapon and missile programs. 

There was growing concern in the War Party over foot-dragging in enlistments in a coalition of the willing. One after another of those who had been eager signers for the Gulf and Afghan wars were making excuses. France's Chirac, who had been the first foreign representative to visit Ground Zero flatly refused. Likewise Germany. "They didn't make the case," explained a German official. Russia, China and Canada and around a hundred more opted out. The War Party was indignant. Richard Perle said the Europeans were "no longer vital to our interests." Rumsfeld put down Western Europe as "Old Europe." Wolfowitz said France needn't apply for any reconstruction contracts. The press jeered that Bush's foreign policy was a "middle finger" foreign policy. 

More and more Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage were out of the loop. Powell's objections to the Axis-of-Evil label were scorned. He and Armitage were the only Bush staffers with battle experience. Being professional soldiers, both were strong for keeping the U. S. military in A-1 condition, ready for fierce defense. But they had emerged from grueling years in the long Vietnam War with determination to discourage more foreign wars. Powell had argued for containment instead of invading Kuwait. But it was noted he would protest passionately up to the point of the Commander-in- Chief's decision, upon which his warrior code told him to shut up and forward march. 

It was getting to be a battle royal between the Defense and State Departments. The Pentagon was making a power grab over matters traditionally belonging to State. Armitage requested official clarification over jurisdiction. But Bush's position became clear when he didn't support Powell in his efforts toward a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Seeking to break a stalemate, Powell announced the pending negotiations wouldn't go forward until Israel halted its military offensive. Wolfowitz and Cheney opposed Powell, and Bush issued a public statement overturning Powell. 

Meanwhile another conflict was rampant in the area of intelligence. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were certain that Saddam had ties to Al-Qaeda and was amassing a huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. They were also certain the CIA hadn't made a determined effort to find out. Rumsfeld told a reporter, "The Agency is trying to disprove links between Iraq and terror." It was Wolfowitz's idea to set up a secret mini intelligence agency attached to the office of his prot‚g‚ Douglas Feith. Its director was Abram Shulsky, a classmate of Wolfowitz at the University of Chicago, where they both studied under the neo-con's founder Leo Strauss. The office called Special Plans assembled data from the other intelligence agencies and from Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi exile group. Special Plans described its work as putting the data "under the microscope." What it did was expand and embroider the information in light of its own ideology and send it out to friendly media. 

Needless to say this infuriated the other agencies. Its output increased until its volume surpassed the others and was Bush's main source of intelligence regarding Iraq and undoubtedly was a major shaper of public opinion and American policy toward Iraq. Lt. Col Kwiatkowski, who was Feith's deputy, said Special Plans was a "propaganda shop" in which un-vetted information, minus any oversight, was "stove piped" to the Oval Office. That operation was another infringement on the State Department with Bush's approval. 

In early 2002 Powell's office had begun work on a Future of Iraq project to plan for post-conflict Iraq. It addressed such potential problems as security vacuum, restoring municipal services, electricity and water and improving living conditions. Powell utilized 17 other federal agencies, as well as the assist of 240 Iraqi exiles knowledgeable in the areas of criminal justice, economics and oil. The expert team compiled thousands of pages of plans and recommendations. It included strategies for utilizing the country's technology and for enlisting civil servants and other established forces. Powell also compiled a list of personnel available to go to Iraq after invasion to implement the plan. When completed, Powell proudly sent the plan to the Pentagon. 

The Future of Iraq plan was dead on arrival. Rumsfeld had decided to put Douglas Feith in charge of planning for postwar Iraq. Feith, who called the Department of State the Department of Nice, scrapped Powell's yearlong project and was relying instead on information being supplied by Chalabi and his exile group that called itself the Iraqi National Congress. Chalabi was a controversial Iraqi who had emigrated to the U. S. as a boy with his parents. He had studied under Leo Strauss at the University of Chicago, then returned to the Middle East and went into banking, later returning to the U. S. after being indicted for bank fraud. Ever since he had been promoting invasion of Iraq by the U. S., while organizing other Iraqi exiles purportedly to assume control of Iraq once Saddam had been deposed. His constant refrain: Iraq is on the verge of spontaneous combustion, lacking only a trigger to set it off. Finally he had found believers in the Bush Administration, though not all believed. Powell said Chalabi's report on weapons of mass destruction was hyped, and Armitage, who had Iraqi contacts, said Chalabi's countrymen thought him a knucklehead. 

Chalabi and his followers had testified glowingly to a vast network of Iraqi dissenters who would rise up on signal and welcome and support an invasion. They would also address security and continuity of services. Chalabi and company were adamant that the entire Iraqi Army must be dismissed and sent home. They said all Baath Party members were untrustworthy, unfit for public duty. Of course, we know that Chalabi's welcoming network didn't materialize, nor did the promised spontaneous popular uprising. The mistaken planning gave rise to a power vacuum that invited the unrestrained plundering and destruction that created suffering for the Iraqi people and an added burden for the American military. 

Powell wasn't the only one tangling with Feith. Feith was exceedingly unpopular with the military. His clashes with General Tommy Franks have been publicized. Franks complained of Feith, "I have to deal with the fucking stupidest guy on the face of the Earth." Though no date had been announced, all knew war was coming, and nerves were frayed, tempers short. Powell didn't confine his anger to Feith. He told a visiting Brit that all neo-cons were "fucking crazies." Armitage called them pissants. Bush Sr., during his administration had characterized them more delicately as "the crazies in the basement." 

Arguments and speculation were rumbling in the Pentagon over whether the Iraqis would retreat or stand their ground. Over how many troops were needed. Over the role of air power. Over whether Baghdad should be immediately targeted. Over how Israel should figure in planning. Over whether the war should be confined to Iraq or spread wider. The heated bickering led to a series of resignations. Of course division was to be expected in that variegated assembly, which we must remember had come together for widely different reasons - reasons for the most part they had managed to conceal. The original neo-cons had been counseled by their mentor Professor Leo Strauss that secrecy in government was to be desired. Certainly the War Party had not shared its purposes with the American public. Deceived and uninformed, Americans too were divided and uncertain as a mysterious foreign war seemed more and more inevitable.