THE NEO-CONS: HOW WE GOT INTO THE DITCH
( from the September 2006 issue of HALVASON NEWS )

New Years 2003 found the Defense Department’s we’re-gonna-take-out-Saddam fever near Fahrenheit boiling. The date hadn’t been set, but all knew it wouldn’t be long. But outside the Pentagon a sharp question was being raised in some sections of the public and press, although rather quietly raised, because of Bush’s “you’re with us, or you’re against us” admonition. The question was: Aren’t you focusing on the wrong country?

What about N. Korea? Some asked. It’s been enriching uranium since 2001. Yet Bush fluffed it off when N. Korea’s unstable dictator boasted he was making it specially for weapons. N. Korea is the most militarized nation in the world with 40% of its people under arms. It’s known to have perfected techniques for hiding its illegal programs, can even make undetectable “cold tests.” Why did Bush rebuff S. Korea’s president when he flew to Washington to talk about collaborating in conciliation approaches to N. Korea?

Others thought Pakistan hardly looks reliable. It’s had the bomb since 1987 and its dictator Musharraf, who got in via coup in 1999, seems to have but slight hold on his office. Agencies in his government supported both Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Should his government fall, could his successor be trusted? Besides, Pakistan’s notorious nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan is said to be operating an international market in nuclear materials. He is known to have supplied nuclear technology to Malaysia and to N. Korea, to which he has made 13 trips in disguise.

Yes, those threats and more were festering on the restless planet, but the Defense Department was hermetically sealed off from all distractions. What absorbed its focused attention was any glitch or delay in its Iraq war plans, and some had dared intrude. Some members of the international community and even some Americans were expressing doubts that Iraq harbored WMD and were saying the weapons inspections should be continued until some were found.

And to date Hans Blix had come up with zilch. Bush and Cheney were furious, because they were certain WMD was there. Blix was either a total incompetent, or was lying. Bush fumed, “He’s playing games with us. His inspections are a joke, yet people want them extended!” Cheney suggested that as Blix was from Sweden, which passed out peace prizes, he was probably a peacenik and covering up WMD.

Another problem was Blair. He was being a worrywart, on the phone daily. He wanted Bush to join him in seeking another U.N. citation against Saddam for not reporting his weapons. Blair insisted he needed it for political reasons. War protestors had gotten wind that U.K. troops were already being positioned in the Gulf Region and were stalking him chanting “Bush’s Poodle.” He had even been attacked in the House of Lords. He feared a “no confidence” vote in Parliament. Bush and Cheney were strongly against another resolution that would certainly cause delay, but Bush told Blair he’d try.

Colin Powell was out of the loop, but not yet expendable. Despite their boast of being willing to go it alone, the war party realized the wisdom of stating their reasons for going to war to the U.N., and they realized the one to state them would have to be the one among them with the most credibility with the international community. There wasn’t a shred of doubt who that one was.

Bush sent for Powell. On January 13, in front of the fireplace in the Oval Office, Bush quietly told Powell he was “going to have to go to war.” He said the weapons inspectors weren’t accomplishing anything and Saddam showed no sign of declaring his weapons. He told Powell he wanted him to go before the Security Council.

Powell listened awhile without comment, then with emphatic seriousness he told Bush, “Mr. President, you know you’re going to be owning this place.” Bush said yes he realized that, but he believed the war was necessary, and he asked, “Are you with me on this? I want you with me.” Powell answered, “I’ll do my best.”

The CIA was instructed to supply Powell with the information George Tenet had used for his famous Slam Dunk WMD assessment. Powell groaned to find what they sent him. Too weak, too murky. He had hoped for something that would justify going to war. He sent his deputy Richard Armitage to the CIA seeking something stronger, but there was nothing. Powell made do with the info, but told Tenet he had to go to the U.N. with him and sit behind him in camera view.

Before the U.N. Security Council on February 3 Powell made the case for a war he believed unnecessary. He expounded on the supplied info: concealed WMD production, biological labs on wheels, stockpiles of warheads, warehouses of sarin, anthrax, and botulism and unmanned aerial vehicles for delivering those horrors. He omitted Cheney’s favorite waker-upper that Saddam had met six times in Prague with Mohammed Atta, the 9/11 captain. He asked the U.N. to take action on Saddam’s failure to meet its demands to disarm.

Three years later highly-respected authorjournalist Robert Sheer interviewed Powell in Los Angeles and reported: “Former Secretary of State Colin Powell told me that he and his department’s top experts never believed that Iraq posed an imminent nuclear threat, but that the president followed the misleading advice of Vice President Dick Cheney and the CIA in making the claim.” (Former CIA director George Tenent claims CIA analysts never said the Iraq threat was imminent.)

Of course Powell was dutifully following the wishes of his commander-in-chief. But didn’t he realize that by abetting a war he believed unnecessary he violated that most important dictum of the Warrior’s Code against purposeless killing? Twelve years before, during the first Gulf War, when his years of battle experience alerted him that the war had been won and killing was no longer justified, he had passionately quoted the warrior’s Code against purposeless killing to General Schwartzskopf in persuading him to shorten the war. For that he was branded “a dove.” Did that experience let allegiance to Bush trump fealty to the Warrior’s Code, to himself and to those who trusted him? Purposeless killing in Iraq, as of this writing, now tallies more than a hundred thousand G.I.s and civilians.

Powell’s speech drew mixed reactions both from the press and from Security Council members. Soon after, Bush sought to bolster war justification to the press. He repeated what he and Cheney had been claiming that there existed a close relationship between Saddam and Al Qaeda, that Saddam had supplied them with valuable technical know-how and had trained the terrorists in chemical and biological warfare and in the use of poisons and deadly gasses.

Although the Saddam Al Qaeda connection would continue to be claimed by the Bush Administration, the Defense Intelligence Agency as early as February ’02 had informed the administration that it did not trust or believe the source of that claim, which had come from a Guantanamo prisoner. Indeed, the prisoner recanted the claim, telling an international investigator that he had confessed it under torture to distract an interrogator. Similarly, Bush and Cheney continued to repeat the fantasy of the aluminum tubes after intelligence had vetted the claim and found the tubes were for making ordinary weapons not nukes and that uranium Saddam was supposed to have ordered from Niger was never ordered at all. Apparently, Bush and Cheney simply couldn’t resist inserting those astonishers into their speeches.

On February 13 France’s Chirac, Russia’s Putin and Germany’s Schroeder issued a joint statement calling for continued weapons inspections. Chirac appeared on “60 Minutes” by video and said, “Nothing today justifies war.” The response to that by the Bush Administration and the right wing press was that at that late date Saddam was still guilty of non-compliance for not responding promptly, and both accused Blix of covering up what he was finding.

Concern was mounting that war coalition enlistment was so low. Those wanting more inspections were among the unwilling and Paul Wolfowitz felt they should be penalized. He executed an order directing that they be barred from bidding on war reconstruction contracts. His order stated it was American policy that “friends will be protected and taken care of, that enemies be punished and that those who refuse to support you will live to regret having done so.”

Wolfowitz, more than the others, was emotionally involved in the coming war. He had promoted it almost-unceasingly since the Seventies. He believed it part of a noble strategy to transform the Middle East into a peaceful, democratic region that would be friendly to Israel and to U.S. interests. So eager was he for the war, he was the first to declare the U.S. should act preemptively to accomplish its objectives. Journalists had noted with amazement that Wolfowitz’s views had become the military policy of the U.S. Seasoned Washington-watchers had observed that no other unelected person had ever wielded as much power in the government as he had, and for the most part he had acquired it quietly under the radar.

Of those Bush had asked to help sell the war, Wolfowitz had worked the hardest, although his sometimes-overwrought zeal drew criticism. Even back in the Nineties his enthusiasm got him dubbed “Wolfowitz of Arabia.” At a recent public lecture he had passionately advocated that the U.S. must not stop at bombing Iraq, it should then move on and bomb Hezbollah bases in Lebanon and warn Syria and Iran they could expect U.S. bombs too if they continued to support terrorism. A former colleague observed of his war fervor, “Hawk doesn’t do him justice. How about velociraptor?”

On February 14 Blix appeared before the U.N. Security Council and reported no prohibited weapons or substances had been found. He was critical of Powell’s presentation and expressed skepticism of the U.S. intelligence Powell had relied on.

Rumors were spreading that Saddam was weighing exile. They were confirmed, though not publicly, when on the evening of February 14 Mubarak’s son Gamal paid a secret visit to the Bush residential quarters and reported Saddam had indicated to Mubarak he would leave Iraq if Egypt would provide a palace for him, his family and aides and if the U.S. would guarantee protection. Bush sent word to Mubarak he would not guarantee protection and would not look favorably on those who did.

Plainly, Bush wanted to keep Saddam in his crosshairs. The War Party’s greatest fear was that Saddam would make some appeal, say to Russia or China, that would scrub their agenda. On February 15 the Pentagon confirmed that 150,000 American troops were stationed in the Gulf region as part of a build-up for a possible war with Iraq. February 15 had been a possible start date for war, but Blair, and coalition members Howard of Australia and Anzar of Spain, were getting political heat and wanted delay.

The news set off massive anti-war protests all over the U.S. and across the world. In London, an estimated one million people surged into the streets. There were large marches in Australia and in some European and Middle Eastern Cities.

As war alarm spread, the world looked to the U.N. to calm the troubled waters. On February 24 Spanish and U.K. Security Council members joined the U.S. in submitting a resolution ordering Iraq to disclose its weapons or face “serious consequences.” France, Germany and Russia quickly removed the threat by proposing that weapons inspections be intensified.

Meanwhile, the War Party was quarreling acrimoniously over war size – how many troops, how much equipment. Powell had early complained that insufficient troops were being assigned, but Powell and his opinion had been marginalized for some time. Now, several generals were saying the invasion force as planned would not hack it.

From the start Rumsfeld had firmly dominated war planning, ordering that the operation be stripped to the minimum. He and Wolfowitz were sold on precision bombing, combined with a small swift-moving ground force to do the job. It was a new and improved way of conducting war, they claimed. Four-star generals were less than thrilled about overturning centuries of military tradition under tutelage of men with no battle experience. Rumsfeld’s strident directives were punctuated with, “Are you getting this yet? Are you getting this yet?” He rejected six consecutive war plans, scrawling “too big.”

Rumsfeld’s insistence on “war lite” sparked sharp disagreement among both the military and the civilian analysts. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 25 that several hundred thousand troops would be needed for peacekeeping in postwar Iraq. Afterward, Rumsfeld dressed down the general in front of a number of other officers.

On February 26 Blair suffered a serious rebellion over his highly unpopular war policy and subservience to Bush, when 122 members of his ruling Labour Party voted against him. He retained parliamentary backing, but just barely.

The “war lite” policy drew sharp criticism from both The Hill and the press. On February 27 Wolfowitz underwent a grilling before Congress. He was defiant, calling General Shinseki’s estimate that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in Postwar Iraq “widely off the mark.” He also knocked down estimates that war reconstruction would be costly for the U.S. Iraq was a wealthy country, he said, with exports worth $15 to $20 billion annually and could pay for its own reconstruction. Wolfowitz had brought along neo-con Dov Lakheim, a Pentagon Comptroller to back him up and both were pressed to give at least some estimate of what the war would cost the taxpayer. When they both clammed up, some representatives taunted them, “You know more than you reveal…..you’re deliberately keeping us in the dark.”

Later, at a Pentagon press conference, when Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz continued their put-down of Shinseki, they were strongly challenged by an Army Colonel, who pointed out that Shinseki successfully commanded peacekeeping in Bosnia. He said that the Senate Armed Services Committee requested Shinseki to state his opinion on troop needs, and he had “responded with his best military judgment.” The Colonel said the General stood by his estimate. When Wolfowitz was asked why he was so convinced only a small force would be needed, he said that Iraqi civilians would welcome an American liberation force and there was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq. For daring to disagree with Rumsfeld’s and Wolfowitz’s plan to invade Iraq with a “war lite” policy, Shinseki became a pariah among the War Party. He retired four months later. Neither Rumsfeld or Wolfowitz attended his retirement ceremony. On March 5 Rumsfeld and Franks went to the Oval Office to inform Bush that 208,000 U.S. troops were already deployed in the Gulf Region. It was a nudge to Bush that he hadn’t yet set a start-up date for the war. The right-wing press was deriding the continuing delay. William Kristol, editor of The Weekly Standard, the neo-con bible financed by Rupert Murdock, was especially impatient with Bush’s seeming timidity. “Stop being a weenie and go do it!”

The hang-up was Blair. He was being derided by both the right wing and left-wing press for toadying to Bush, and he could see a no-confidence vote coming. He badly needed that U.N. resolution Bush had agreed to co-sponsor. Rumsfeld, angry with Blair for causing delay, stated in a Pentagon briefing that the U.S. might go to war without U.K. That drew a hot rebuke from the British Ambassador to the U.S. France threatened to veto the Bush-Blair resolution if submitted, thereby drawing a hot rebuke from the British Ambassador to the U.N.

It was a grueling time of doubts and uncertainty. Recently, in London a 2003 memorandum was leaked that recorded a phone conversation between Bush and Blair discussing the feasibility of having a spy plane painted U.N. colors fly over Iraq, enticing Iraqis to take a shot at it. That report prompted a wag to wonder if the idea came from the same genius who after the invaders found no WMD proposed having some planted to be discovered.

Reportedly, it was discussed with some seriousness. In mid-March Bush received some foreign visitors. A personal envoy of Pope John Paul II met with Bush to urge that the U.S. not invade Iraq. He said it would mean civilian tragedies and would further divide Muslims. Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel came to urge Bush to invade. “In the name of morality, how can we not interfere,” he said. Bush told him, “It’s very wise of you. If we don’t disarm Saddam Hussein, he will put a weapon of mass destruction on Israel.” The Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah sent word he hoped war could be avoided, but his Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Bandar was strongly urging war. King Abdullah of Jordan sent word he was for war.

Rather suddenly, Bush decided to hold a mini-summit. It was partly to calm Blair, party to look war-avoiding. Blair agreed, but his aides asked please don’t meet in London and attract war-protesters. They settled on the Azores. The Portuguese Prime Minister Barroso would play host and Spanish Prime Minister Aznar would be invited. Both men supported the war.

On Sunday, March 16 they assembled in the Azores at the island airport. There the four agreed that as Saddam had not met the Security Council’s demand to disarm, there was legal cause for invasion. Bush said the U.N. would not run the war, the coalition would, and the war would start in a matter of days.

While in the Azores they learned that Chirac was to be on “60 Minutes” via tape calling for 30 more days of weapons inspections. With that Blair and Bush realized their U.N. resolution wouldn’t fly. With the clock now ticking Bush was gripped by an alarming thought: What if some disgruntled coalition refusenik were to introduce a proposal to rescind the U.N.’s disarm demand? He and Rice got on the phones. The refuseniks were blandished with assurances there were no hard feelings, then tactfully asked that they not introduce any new weapons resolutions.

Chilean President Lagos had been noncooperative. Bush phoned Aznar and asked him to phone Lagos and prevail on him not to cause a problem. The Russians had been tantalizingly noncommittal. Rice phoned the Russian defense minister and when unable to obtain a firm promise, then queried him about a rumor that the foreign minister had something in mind: “Please don’t send Igor to the U.N.,” she pleaded.

Other calls were made to coalition members who might be wavering. Despite Bush’s boast of an abundance of allies, the truth was the U.S. and U.K. were largely going into battle alone, except for 200 Australian troops. The impressively long roster was mostly obscure states and tiny island kingdoms. A call to the Bulgarian prime minister was somewhat unsettling. He said they were still among the willing but didn’t want it publicized.

On the morning of March 17 Bush told Franks to be on the alert to start the war, possibly in 72 hours. Then he told Press Secretary Ari Fleischer to inform the press he’d be addressing the nation at 8 p.m. He planned to give Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to remove himself and his sons from Iraq within 48 hours or face military consequences.

Before his address Bush met with Senate and House leaders in the White House Roosevelt Room. He told them, “We did everything we could in the U.N. to avoid war.” He said if Saddam left they’d go in anyway and remove the WMD. Rice said, “We want to put the administration of Iraq in the hands of Iraqis as soon as possible.” Cheney said, “I think we will be greeted as liberators.”

The next morning Blair addressed Parliament and told them what was ahead. Following an all-day debate, at 11:15 p.m. the body voted 217 to 396 for war. A third of Blair’s party voted no.

The following morning General Franks phoned from an airfield in Saudi Arabia that all was in order. “The forces are ready to go.” Immediately after, Bush began phoning coalition members the war would begin that night. It seemed the ship of war was ready to roll down the ramp. And all remained was for Bush to tell the nation.

Then surprise, surprise! At 4 p.m. a very excited George Tenet came to tell Bush that CIA operatives inside Iraq believed they knew where Saddam and his sons were spending the night. It was at a farm on the Tigris River south of Baghdad. The operatives were still checking to make sure. Not long after, word came from Iraq that it looked certain. An elated Bush asked if the intelligence was reliable. “I can’t give you 100% assurance,” Tenet said, “but this is as good as it gets.” It set off a near frenzy in the White House. Would it cause what was at that point unthinkable, a change in plans? By 7:12 p.m. the decision was made. Franks would dispatch two Nighthawk bombers followed immediately by two Tomahawk cruise missiles to target the farmhouse.

Bush would address the nation around 10 p.m. Some of the war party were gathered before a television set waiting when at 9:30 came reports that an air raid siren was sounding in Baghdad! At 10:16 Bush went on television to say, “My fellow citizens, at this hour American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.”

In the middle of the night Tenet called the White House and told the officer on duty, “Tell the president we got the son of a bitch.” Bush wasn’t wakened. The next day, amid a barrage of war news was a report that Saddam hadn’t been at the targeted farmhouse and both his sons had crawled from the rubble alive.

Epilogue: As I finish my mini-history of how we got into the Iraq War, the war is now three years, five months and 16 days old. As a lifelong peace activist after being war widowed, I greatly wanted to know how, after the sadly mistaken Vietnam War, we could stumble into another tragic quagmire. I had wondered how long the war planners thought their war would last, and last week I learned in a Bob Woodward book that shortly before the war began Rumsfeld asked that question of a group of war planners meeting in his office. Their answers were: General Richard Myers 30 days, General Tommy Franks weeks not months, General Peter Pace less than a month, Lt. General John Craddock 21 days, General Larry DiRitter 30 days, Paul Wolfowitz seven days. Rumsfeld declined to estimate and Cheney wasn’t there. Some time later Bush said weeks not months.

After earnest research to determine who were most responsible for the war, I concluded them to be four. Again The Four Horsemen! They were in rank of culpability Wolfowitz, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Bush. Before starting I wrongly held Bush most responsible. Deciding wasn’t easy, because, more than in any other war in American history, the perpetrators concealed their reasons from the public.

Press coverage helped little because the mainstream press accepted the official reason that we had to abolish Saddam before he abolished us. These four so very different men, from widely different backgrounds, who found themselves on the same mission accidentally, not surprisingly had different reasons and objectives and some were intensely personal. Moreover, their objectives were largely concealed from one another, because they were using one another to achieve them.

Paul Wolfowitz believed the Iraq War would benefit American interests in the region and insure access to vital oil, but he most passionately wanted security for Israel, where he lived as a child and had family. He was convinced that if Iraq were liberated and shepherded into becoming a democracy it would by example spread democracy to its neighbors, thereby transforming the Middle East into a friendly place that would be hospitable to Israel.

Dick Cheney, a nationalistic, suspicious hawk, venerated power, unchallengeable power, and would settle for nothing less for his country. It rankled deep in him that tiny Iraq harbored something that threatened the U.S. In my opinion Cheney alone of the four really believed in the WMD. Toppling Saddam Hussein would show the world the U.S. was the supreme super power, what’s more was the unrivaled economic power, having acquired the power to control the world’s second-largest oil reserves.

Donald Rumsfeld was no less a hawk than Cheney, but his obsession was different. It was war-transformation, bringing the U.S. military into the 21st century. He had read up on the new military planes and technology and envisioned that the old style boots-on-the-ground war could be replaced with “war lite,” smaller and fewer of everything. He had been away from government for 25 years as a manufacturing CEO and enjoyed introducing new products. By introducing “war lite” to the world he could go down in military history for his innovation. Bush initially resisted before being sold on the war by Cheney in 2002. He had campaigned on a promise of war-avoidance, but war did have appeals for him. He had hated having his father called a wimp for not invading Iraq in the first Gulf War. Also he would be nobly leading a crusade against non-believers. And he so wanted to be a popular president, and history showed most war presidents were popular. Once converted he quickly became impassioned.

According to one interpretation of The Four Horsemen, when their depredations have at last subsided, we mortals will find enlightenment. Pray that we do.